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Abstract Can the general public learn to deal with risk and uncertainty, or do authorities
need to steer people’s choices in the right direction? Libertarian paternalists argue that
results from psychological research show that our reasoning is systematically flawed and
that we are hardly educable because our cognitive biases resemble stable visual illusions.
For that reason, theymaintain, authorities who knowwhat is best for us need to step in and
steer our behavior with the help of Bnudges.^Nudges are nothing new, but justifying them
on the basis of a latent irrationality is. In this article, I analyze the scientific evidence
presented for such a justification. It suffers from narrow logical norms, that is, a
misunderstanding of the nature of rational thinking, and from a confirmation bias, that
is, selective reporting of research. These two flaws focus the blame on individuals’minds
rather than on external causes, such as industries that spend billions to nudge people into
unhealthy behavior. I conclude that the claim that we are hardly educable lacks evidence
and forecloses the true alternative to nudging: teaching people to become risk savvy.
Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people…
John Adams, 1765
Bounded rationality is not irrationality.… On the contrary, I think there is plenty
of evidence that people are generally quite rational; that is, they usually have
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Libertarian paternalism, as it is called, is a variant of soft paternalism that uses a bag
of tricks called Bnudges^ to influence people’s decisions. A nudge is a tool for
influencing people without using incentives, which are the lifeblood of economic theory,
and without enforcing behavior, the essence of hard paternalism. The program is called
Bpaternalistic^ because it tries to guide people and Blibertarian^ because no choices are
taken away. In the best paternalistic spirit, its goal is to protect others from harm. Yet its
rationale is not to defend us from enemies outside. Instead, the program wants to protect
us from ourselves, from our systematic reasoning errors, inertia, and intuition.
Nudging is nothing new. Governments and marketing agencies have relied on it for a
long time. Consider the appointment letters sent in many countries to women above age 50
for mammography screening. These letters contain a preset time and location. This default
booking is a nudge that exploits inertia—women might not take the effort to actively sign
up and, similarly, not take the effort to decline the appointment. Furthermore, in the letters
and pamphlets encouraging screening, it is often stated that early detection reduces breast
cancer mortality by 20 %. That figure is a second nudge that exploits people’s statistical
illiteracy. Screening reduces breast cancer mortality from about 5 to 4 in 1,000 women
(after 10 years), which amounts to an absolute risk reduction of 1 in every 1,000. But this
figure is typically presented as a relative risk reduction of 20%, often rounded up to 30%,
to look more impressive (Gigerenzer 2014a, b).
This example illustrates the difference between nudging and educating. The aim of
the appointment letters is to increase participation rates, not understanding. As a result,
women in the European Union are less knowledgeable about the benefit of screening
than Russian women, who are not nudged by relative risks and similar persuasive
techniques (Gigerenzer et al. 2009). Education, by contrast, aims at Ba general knowl-
edge among the people^ (see introductory epigram), and would require measures to
make the public statistically literate and to enforce transparent information policies so
that citizens can make informed decisions. But there are often conflicts of interest: in the
case of mammography screening, informed citizens might understand that only few
women benefit while many are harmed, which would likely decrease participation rates.
The example also serves to illustrate the difference between nudging and hard
paternalism. Whereas women in Europe and the US can opt out, the president of
Uruguay, an oncologist, made biennial screening mandatory for all working women
age 40 to 59 (Arie 2013).
The interest in nudging as opposed to education should be understood against the specific
political background in which it emerged. In the US, the public education system is largely
considered a failure, and the government tries hard to find ways to steer large sections of the
public who can barely read and write. Yet this situation does not apply everywhere.
1 Nudging Is Not the Same as Libertarian Paternalism
In the literature, nudging and libertarian paternalism are conflated. Nudging is a label
for non-coercive ways already known to steer people. The celebrated etched black fly
in airport urinals to reduce spillage and the stripes on Chicago highways to slow down
drivers are instance of nudges integrated into the design of everyday things (Norman
1990), based on J. J. Gibson’s concept of affordances. My own research program on
ecological rationality is another point in case, where we teach laypeople and experts to
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use representations such as absolute risks and heuristic tools such as fast-and-frugal
trees to make better decisions (Gigerenzer 2014a, b; Gigerenzer et al. 2011).
In this article, I do not argue against nudging per se. But I do object to the
justification of such techniques on the basis of people’s lack of rationality by libertarian
paternalists such as Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 2008). This justification focuses the
blame for societal problems exclusively on the individual mind, closing our eyes to
institutions that steer individual behavior so that they can take advantage of it, and it
misleadingly suggests that a more sustainable solution, educating people, is a hopeless
endeavor. Thus, the target of my analysis is the program of libertarian paternalism, not
nudging per se.
A second obstacle to every fruitful discussion of nudging is the multiplicity of its
meanings. Since the publication of Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) Nudge, almost
everything that affects behavior has been renamed a nudge, which renders this concept
meaningless.1 Thus it is important to stick to its original meaning, which I define here
consistently with the thoughtful analysis by Rebonato (2012):
Libertarian paternalism is a set of interventions aimed at overcoming people’s
stable cognitive biases by exploiting them in such a way as to steer their decisions
towards the choices they themselves would make if they were rational.
In the case of appointment letters, the biases targeted are inertia and lack of statistical
literacy, and both are exploited to steer women into screening. The political philosophy
of libertarian paternalism consists of three parts:
– Objective. A benevolent Bchoice architect^ (policy maker) determines what is best
for the people. The people themselves, however, are rarely asked because they are
assumed to lack rationality (see justification).
– Engineering. A nudge is introduced to change people’s behavior in the desired
direction, without incentives, coercion, or education.
– Justification. To justify why governments should nudge their citizens in the first
place rather than educate them, libertarian paternalists call upon psychological
research that has allegedly shown people’s systematic lack of rationality and
inability to unlearn their errors.
In this article, I investigate the scientific evidence for the justification of nudging and
the benevolent choice architect. I do not analyze the engineering part, given that the
engineering tools were mostly known before the term nudging was even coined. Their
impact was investigated by the House of Lords (2011), whose Bcentral finding is that
1 The confusion begins in Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) book itself. First they clarify that a nudge is a tool that
changes people’s behavior without Bsignificantly changing their economic incentives^ (p. 6)—after all, if
nudges were incentives, they would be nothing new. But later, in their list of Ba dozen nudges^ (p. 232), the
authors discuss the Bdollar a day^ program, in which city governments pay teenage girls who already have a
baby a dollar for each day they are not pregnant. This program for reducing second pregnancies uses good old
monetary incentives, which are now presented as nudges. Thaler and Sunstein comment: BThus far, the results
have been extremely promising^ (p. 232) and cite a preliminary study with no control group. As an aside, I
was curious about how big the effect was and in a literature search found one randomized trial by Stevens-
Simon et al. (1997) with 286 girls. This controlled study reported that providing a dollar a day did not change
the rates of second pregnancies at all.
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non-regulatory measures used in isolation, including ‘nudges’, are less likely to be
effective^ (p. 5). The report concluded that there Bis a lack of applied research at a
population level to support specific interventions to change the behavior of large groups
of people (including lack of evidence on cost-effectiveness and long-term impact)^ (p.
18). Missing proof of effectiveness at the population level need not be held against the
nudging tools, I believe, given that so little funding is spent on behavioral factors—
only 0.5 % of health research in the UK. But a danger is that nudging may become an
excuse for not protecting consumers. The House of Lords criticized the Cameron
Government for focusing on nudging citizens instead of considering other, more
efficient options such as prohibiting television advertising of products high in fat, salt,
and sugar. Before beginning, however, I would like to acknowledge that libertarian
paternalists have made an impressive effort in making governmental officials aware of
psychological factors.
In no way do I claim to be exhaustive in my analysis, but I hope to supplement the
reader with that part of psychological evidence that has been left out of the standard
justification for nudging. As I will argue in some detail, the dismal picture of human
nature painted by behavioral economists and libertarian paternalists is not justified by
psychological research. Rather, it is largely the product of narrow logical norms of
rationality and selective reporting of the psychological literature. Most important for
public policy, by comparing cognitive illusions with visual illusions, libertarian pater-
nalists misleadingly suggest that attempts to liberate people from their biases through
education are largely doomed to fail. However, as I will show, there is experimental
evidence that even children can learn to deal with risk and uncertainty—if they are
taught how. I will conclude that democratic governments should invest less in nudging
and more in educating people to become risk savvy.
1.1 The Enemy Within
According to libertarian paternalism, psychological research has discovered that people
are not rational but suffer from cognitive illusions. The point is not simply that people
make mistakes; that is nothing new. Their key point is that something inside our mind
makes virtually everyone err in systematic ways. In Ariely’s (2008, p. xviii) words, the
conclusion is that Bwe are not only irrational but predictably irrational – that our
irrationality happens the same way, again and again.^ What are these irrationalities?
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) explain:
BPeople do not exhibit rational expectations, fail to make forecasts that are
consistent with Bayes’ rule, use heuristics that lead them to make systematic
blunders, exhibit preference reversals (that is, they prefer A to B and B to A) and
make different choices depending on the wording of the problem^ (p. 176).
In this account, the enemy is within us, embodied in the very nature of our thinking. As
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) wittily asserted, humans are not even remotely like Homo
economicus, but more like Homer Simpson. That message has become extremely popular,
precisely because it is directed against neoclassical economists and other libertarians. For
instance, in her book Against Autonomy (2013), legal philosopher Sarah Conly concluded
that John StuartMill Bfailed to adequately reckon with human psychology, as we now know
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it to be^ (p. 8) and that Bthe existence of cognitive deficits does suggest a need for different
sorts of legislation, […] coercive paternalism, for laws that force people to do what is good
for them^ (p. 2–3). In his essay BPaternalism and Cognitive Bias^ (2005), philosopher J. D.
Trout maintained: BOur review of the biases will show that they are virtually as stable,
durable, and universal as reflexes^ (p. 396) and Bthat the Enlightenment vision is profoundly
mistaken^ (p. 397). Likewise, behavioral economist Richard Thaler (1991) asserted that
Bmental illusions should be considered the rule rather than the exception^ (p. 4). With
somewhat more nuance, psychologist Daniel Kahneman (2011) stated: BDemocracy is
inevitably messy, in part because the availability and affect heuristics that guide citizens’
beliefs and attitudes are inevitably biased, even if they generally point in the right direction^
(p. 145).
In spite of this heavy-duty rhetoric, libertarian paternalists do not try to overthrow
Homo economics. On the contrary, as the quoted list of irrationalities illustrates, they
rather uncritically accept the rules of axiomatic decision theory as the norm for all
rational behavior, and blame mortals for not living up to this ideal. As a result, Homo
sapiens (Bman the wise^) appears to be a misnomer, and on two counts:
People Lack Rationality The claim is that experiments have unambiguously shown
that people suffer from systematic reasoning errors, due to their cognitive
limitations.
People Are Hardly Educable The claim that people largely cannot unlearn these
errors is typically made through the use of analogies rather than evidence. The
three analogies used are visual illusions, the reptilian brain, and a biologically
hard-wired System 1 that relies on heuristics and intuition rather than on statistics
and logic. The choice of analogies aligns cognitive errors with biological deter-
minism. For instance, comparing reasoning errors—aptly called cognitive illu-
sions—to visual illusions implies that trying to educate people out of them is a
doomed effort.
In short, the argument is that cognitive deficits are both widespread and next
to impossible to eradicate. The second claim is not always stated explicitly, but
without it, paternalists would have to explain why they prefer nudging to
educating people. These two claims provide the rationale for governmental
intervention. Libertarian paternalism’s justification for intervention is quite
different from that of neoclassical economic theory, where intervention may
be deemed necessary in cases of imperfections of the market, such as when a
firm has a monopoly, or when free markets do not produce a fair distribution of
income. To redress these imperfections or inequalities, governments can inter-
fere. However, if, as libertarian paternalists say, the imperfections are engraved
in our brains rather than in the market, there is little hope of redressing them.
In this very sense, libertarian paternalism is more red-blooded than some forms
of hard paternalism, even if it does not use coercion (Rebonato 2012). Hard
paternalists may justify intervention on the grounds that individuals rationally
pursue their selfish goals instead of the welfare of the society. Libertarian
paternalists, in contrast, advocate that people do not know how to pursue their
own goals and may not even know what goals are worth pursuing in the first
place.
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In this article, I will argue:
1. The evidence for systematic irrationality is far from being as clear-cut as claimed
by libertarian paternalists. Specifically, their claims have been based on (i) narrow
logical norms, that is, a misunderstanding of the ecological nature of rationality,
and (ii) a confirmation bias, that is, selective reporting of research.
2. Nor is the argument that people are non-educable backed by clear-cut empirical
evidence. Instead, studies show that children, adults, and experts can learn statis-
tical thinking with the help of adequate numerical or visual representations.
Educating people to become more risk savvy is the true alternative to the program
of blaming and nudging people (Gigerenzer 2014a, b).
3. Libertarian paternalism requires a technocracy of experts who know what is best
for us in order to steer us there. This assumes choice architects who do not suffer
from the same cognitive errors and who pursue no conflicting interests. Among
professionals in health and wealth, however, studies show that such benevolent
professionals and governmental officials are largely nonexistent. The remedy is the
same as in Point 2: to invest in educating people to become risk savvy so that they
can critically evaluate governmental policies.
These three points bring to light the individualistic bias that the libertarian
paternalism program inherited from its intellectual source, the heuristics-and-
biases program (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1972). Virtually every blunder is
attributed to a flaw in the human mind, even if part of the problem lies in industries
that persuade individuals into unhealthy behaviors, from smoking to fast food to
excessive alcohol consumption. As we will see, strategic interaction and social
intelligence are mistaken for logical error (Point 1), errors are attributed to lack of
rationality rather than to lack of education (Point 2), and choice architects are
assumed to be benevolent philosopher-kings rather than employees of organiza-
tions that may pursue conflicting interests (Point 3).
2 On the Evidence for Systematic Deviations from Rationality
I will restrict my analysis to three of the allegedly stable cognitive errors cited by Thaler
and Sunstein (2003, p. 176) above:
1. People Bmake different choices depending on the wording of the problem,^ which
is known as the framing effect.
2. People Bfail to make forecasts that are consistent with Bayes’ rule,^ which is
known as the base rate fallacy.
3. People Buse heuristics that lead them to make systematic blunders,^ which is part
of the postulate that using statistics and logic always leads to more accurate
judgments than when relying on heuristics and intuition.
To be clear, I will evaluate the very experimental evidence that libertarian
paternalists present to make their case for systematic human irrationality. I am
not arguing that people never make errors (nor would neoclassical economists
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make such an argument). There are multiple other reasons for harmful behavior,
including the fast food and tobacco industry’s multi-billion-dollar advertisement
campaigns to seduce people into unhealthy lifestyles and the failure of educational
systems worldwide to teach children statistical thinking. Libertarian paternalists,
like the behavioral economists they draw upon, make a case against the human
mind and thereby turn a blind eye to flaws in human institutions.
2.1 Framing Effects
A framing effect occurs when people’s choices differ depending on how two Blogically
equivalent^ statements are framed. This variation is said to be inconsistent with rational
behavior because it violates description invariance, an Bessential condition for a theory
of choice that claims normative status^ (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, p. S253).
Framing effects are of central importance for libertarian paternalism. They justify the
argument that there is no viable alternative to paternalism: Because it is impossible to
avoid framing options, someone must decide how to do it (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p.
11). Framing effects also justify why paternalists rarely try to find out what preferences
individuals actually have, in spite of emphasizing that a Bpolicy is ‘paternalistic’ if it
tries to influence choices in a way that will make choosers better off, as judged by
themselves.^ (p. 5; emphasis in the original). The justification is that people are
unreliable sources—their answers and Brevealed preferences^ may depend on how
the question is framed (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, p. 178). In this view, it is unfruitful to
ask people, subject to these biases, what they really want. In Bazerman and Neale’s
(1986, p. 317) words, framing effects Bsuggest that individuals are generally affected by
systematic deviations from rationality.^
I disagree with the assertion that logical equivalence or description invariance
constitutes a general norm for rational behavior. Here is why.
Consider the prototype of all framing examples:
The glass is half full.
The glass is half empty.
Should the choice of description matter? In an experiment, a full glass of water (A)
and an empty one (B) are put on the table. The experimenter asks the participant to pour
half of the water into the other glass, and then to place the Bhalf-empty glass^ at the
edge of the table. Most people choose glass A, the previously full glass (Sher and
McKenzie 2006). This and similar experiments show that in many situations, the
framing of a request encodes surplus information, here about the past state of the glass,
that serves as a reference point, and that most people intuitively understand which glass
is meant (McKenzie and Nelson 2003). There is nothing irrational about social
intelligence, which here entails the ability to listen carefully to a speaker and reduce
uncertainty. At issue are pragmatic inferences, not logical ones. More generally, the
analysis of the relation between mind and environment—here between speaker and
listener—is called the study of ecological rationality (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001).
Description equivalence, in contrast, is a form of logical rationality. As a normative
theory of choice, logical rationality does not enable us to decipher the message.
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Now consider a case of framing presented by libertarian paternalists (Sunstein 2013,
p. 61; Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 39). You suffer from a serious heart disease,
consider a dangerous heart surgery, and ask your doctor about its prospect. The doctor
can frame the answer in two different ways:
Five years after surgery, 90 % of patients are alive.
Five years after surgery, 10 % of patients are dead.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argued that you should not pay attention to how your
doctor frames the message. Citing a single study, they asserted that in numerous
experiments people react very differently Beven though the content of the two state-
ments is exactly the same^ (p. 39) and concluded that Bframing works because people
tend to be somewhat mindless, passive decision makers^ and so it offers a Bbrief
glimpse at human fallibility^ (p. 40).
Before we go on, let us briefly consider the actual evidence. A systematic review of 40
framing studies with mostly hypothetical choices showed that participants were indeed
more likely to consent to surgery in the survival frame than in the mortality frame. The
review also showed that this effect was specific rather general: There was no evidence of a
framing effect for consent to medication or immunization instead of surgery, nor when real
as opposed to hypothetical decisions were studied (Moxey et al. 2003).
Now let us apply the same ecological analysis as with the half-full/half-empty glass to the
survival/mortality frame in the surgery scenario. Instead of regarding the logical structure
alone, consider the patient’s goal. To make a rational decision, the patient needs to know the
answer to the question BIs survival higher with or without surgery?^ Neither B90 %
survival^ nor B10 % mortality^ provides sufficient information for a rational decision.
What the patient also needs to know is the survival rate without surgery. Although that is
the reference point against which the surgery option needs to be compared, this essential
information is not explicitly stated in this textbook problem, where there is no doctor to ask.
Thus, participants have to rely on their social intelligence to make an informed guess.
By framing the option, speakers can convey information about the reference point,
something listeners tend to intuitively understand. Experiments showed that if the
reference point was lower (Bfewer patients survive without surgery^), then 80–94 %
of the participants chose the Bsurvival^ frame, but if the reference point was higher
(Bmore patients survive without surgery^), then the survival frame was chosen less
frequently (McKenzie and Nelson 2003). Thus, a doctor’s choice between logically
equivalent frames can provide relevant information about the reference point. By
choosing a survival frame, the doctor can communicate that surgery has a substantial
benefit compared to no surgery, and make an implicit recommendation. To conclude,
logically equivalent frames are not necessarily informationally equivalent.
Note that the reference point that is implicitly communicated by framing an option
has nothing to do with prospect theory’s reference point. Prospect theory is based on an
individualistic analysis that pays no attention to strategic interaction.
To illustrate the generality of the argument against logical norms, consider a final
example, the notorious Asian disease problem (Tversky and Kahneman 1981), where a
disease is expected to kill 600 people and participants have to choose between two
programs. The benefits of the programs are framed positively or negatively. Here is the
positive (gain) frame:
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If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved (riskless option).
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be
saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved (risky option)
And here the negative (loss) frame:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die (riskless option).
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a
two-thirds probability that 600 people will die (risky option)
In comparison with the previous two framing tasks, now a risky option is added.
Many experiments showed that when choosing between gains, a majority preferred the
riskless option A, but when choosing between losses, a majority preferred the risky
option D. Once again, the positive frame is said to be logically equivalent to the
negative frame, which makes the majority choice appear logically inconsistent.
But look carefully at the wording, and you will notice something. The risky options are
completely specified, whereas the riskless options are not. For instance, the riskless option
notes that B200 people will be saved,^ without adding Band 400 will not be saved.^ That
should make no difference according to logical rationality, given that framing in terms of
gains and losses is preserved. Nor should it make a difference from the logic of prospect
theory. But it should make a difference for intelligent people, because incomplete spec-
ification is the very tool for making implicit recommendations. This is easy to see after
noticing that the two (riskless) options that are only partially specified correspond to the
two frames of the surgery problem. Consistent with this ecological rather than logical
analysis, studies reported that the framing effect is driven by the riskless options, not by the
risky options (see Kühberger and Gradl 2013). Moreover, when researchers completely
specified the riskless options, the framing effect in the Asian disease problem disappeared
(Kühberger 1995; Kühberger and Tanner 2010; Mandel 2001). Once again, this suggests
that people tend to assume that the choice of frame Bleaks^ information, that is, makes an
implicit recommendation. If this possibility is eliminated by adding the unspoken alter-
native, then the framing effect disappears.
In sum, research on these three classical framing effects indicates that logical equivalence
is a poor general norm for understanding human rationality. An ecological analysis suggests
that speakers rely on framing in order to implicitly convey relevant information and make
recommendations, and that listeners also pay attention to these. In these situations, framing
effects clearly do not demonstrate that people are Bmindless, passive decision makers,^ as
Thaler and Sunstein (see above) asserted. In fact, the art of reading between the lines is more
cognitively demanding than the narrow logic of descriptive invariance. After all, computers
have no problems mastering logic but still struggle with understanding natural language.
As mentioned above, libertarian paternalists do not see any alternative to nudging, given
that a message is always framed in some form or another. Yet the previous examples show
that there is indeed a simple alternative to positive or negative framing, namely to specify a
quantitative message in its entirety, such as B90 % of patients are alive and 10 % are dead.^
2.1.1 Strategic Interaction Mistaken as Logical Error
The previous analysis of framing effects in terms of communicating reference points
and signaling recommendations does not apply to all framing effects. But it should
suffice to make the point that descriptive invariance is not a reasonable yardstick for
rational behavior in general. The same analysis applies to various other alleged
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cognitive illusions, such as default effects and the Linda problem. Whereas paternalists
tend to explain default effects, as in organ donation, by people’s inertia, Johnson and
Goldstein (2003) found substantial default effects even when no effort was required,
and subsequent experiments indicated that many people interpret policy makers’ choice
of default as the recommended action (McKenzie, Liersch, and Finkelstein 2006).
Similarly, although Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 29) called people’s majority response
in the Linda problem Ban obvious logical mistake,^ other research concluded that what
they assumed to be a logical error is in fact social intelligence at work (once again).
This research has also shown how to make the Berror^ largely disappear (e.g., Fiedler
1988; Hertwig and Gigerenzer 1999; consistent with earlier research on set inclusion by
Inhelder and Piaget (1964, p. 101). Finally, a systematic review of hundreds of framing
studies could not find a single one showing that framing effects incur real costs in terms
of health or wealth (Arkes, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig 2015).
Libertarian paternalists and some behavioral economists may be among the last
professionals who cherish the ideal that logic by itself provides a universal yardstick for
human intelligence. Even neoclassical economists have gone beyond logical rational-
ity; the ecological analysis provided above is akin to research on signaling, co-
ordination games, and strategic interaction. For instance, Sen (1993) argued that the
rationality of behavior cannot be determined by using a purely logical principle such as
consistency without investigating people’s goals and motives. Even when there is no
strategic interaction, the idea that logically equivalent formulations should not matter
misses the essence of real intelligence. The physicist Richard Feynman (1967) was
keen to point out the importance of different formulations of the same physical law,
even if they are logically equivalent: BPsychologically they are different because they
are completely unequivalent when you are trying to guess new laws^ (p. 53). Logic is
certainly a tool of rationality, but is not the only one in the toolbox.
All in all, the principle of descriptive invariance is, by itself, an inappropriate
yardstick of rationality. Framing effects, defined as the violation of this principle, can
be the result of strategic interaction, interpreted signaling of recommended options, and
other forms of social intelligence. These typically intuitive forms of intelligence are
misinterpreted in the behavioral economic literature as cognitive errors that are hard to
unlearn. What this literature overlooks is that when intuition is smarter than logic, there
is little need to educate people out of their Blogical errors.^
2.1.2 Paternalists’ Confirmation Bias
I have devoted some space to studies that question the logical norm of descriptive
invariance because these studies are rarely if ever discussed by libertarian paternalists,
despite the importance they attribute to framing effects. You can call this a bias for
people’s biases, or a confirmation bias: presenting studies that appear to demonstrate
people’s systematic deviations from rationality but omitting those from researchers who
do not find biases or disagree with the yardstick of rationality used in the first place. For
instance, to my knowledge the well-known research of the McKenzie group on framing
has been mentioned neither in the libertarian paternalist literature nor in most of the
behavioral economics literature that argues that all framing effects violate rationality. I
have observed the same confirmation bias for other so-called cognitive illusions (see
Gigerenzer, Fiedler, and Olsson 2012; Gigerenzer 2000). Here is one last example.
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BOne of the most significant and irrefutable findings of behavioral psychologists is that
people are overconfident in their judgments^ (Parikh 2009, p. 142). Similar absolute
statements are frequent, indicating high confidence in overconfidence. A glance into the
psychological research, however, shows a quite different picture. To beginwith, half a dozen
different phenomena whose relation is currently unknown have been labeled overconfi-
dence. Consider first miscalibration of subjective probabilities, one of these allegedly
irrefutable findings. Since the mid-1990s, however, studies have shown that what is called
miscalibration is not a systematic error by ordinary people, as claimed, but an artifact—that
is, a systematic error made by researchers who mistake people’s unsystematic error for a
systematic one (details in Dawes and Mulford 1996; Erev et al. 1994). This is known as
misinterpreting regression to the mean, which is a consequence of an imperfect correlation,
not of systematic bias. The same error appears to have made in the classical study allegedly
demonstrating that people systematically overestimate small risks and underestimate large
risks (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982). A reanalysis showed that the
Bmiscalibration^ is largely a result of regression to the mean and not due to systematic
biases of the participants, as was and still is reported (Hertwig, Pachur, and Kurzenhäuser
2005). A second phenomenon that is also called overconfidence (mean confidence minus
proportion correct) has been shown to be due to researchers’ unrepresentative (i.e., selective)
sampling of questions: An analysis of 130 studies showed that overconfidence disappears
when questions are representatively sampled (Juslin, Winman, and Olsson 2000). These
ecological analyses should suffice to make the point; for more on overconfidence research,
see Olsson (2014).
This is not to say that people are never overconfident. If you earn your money by
forecasting exchange rates or the stock market, you had better be overconfident;
otherwise no one will buy your advice. But functional overconfidence is not the same
as people’s hardwired cognitive illusion. My point here is different. In the paternalist
literature I have not seen discussions of the existing research that concludes that most
people have unsystematic, but not systematic biases. Nor have I seen references to the
research concluding that some paternalists’ claims are based on their own errors in
statistical thinking, as illustrated above. Based on analyses of hundreds of studies on
overconfidence, evidence for both of these conclusions has been compiled by the group
around Peter Juslin (e.g., Juslin, Winman, and Olsson 2000; Juslin, Winman, and
Hansson 2007). Yet this research is ignored in the nudging literature.
2.2 Bayes’ Rule
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argued that people Bfail to make forecasts that are consistent
with Bayes’ rule^ (cited above). This claim goes back to Kahneman and Tversky (1972,
p. 450), who rejected earlier research concluding that people are approximate, albeit
conservative Bayesians: BIn his evaluation of evidence, man is apparently not a conser-
vative Bayesian: he is not Bayesian at all.^ Unlike descriptive invariance, Bayes’ rule is
a strict consequence of the axioms of probability. Thus, here we have a real test case for
rationality. If the conditions for Bayes’ rule are met, and if people’s forecasts system-
atically deviate from the rule and they do not learn from errors, then there is a good case
to be made that they are behaving irrationally. I cannot review here the vast psycholog-
ical literature on Bayesian reasoning, but will simply point out those parts that arrived at
strikingly different conclusions than those suggested by the libertarian paternalists.
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There are two research paradigms for studying Bayesian inference, the probability
learning paradigm and the text problem paradigm. In the learning paradigm, people
learn probabilities from experience, and are subsequently tested as to whether they
make judgments consistent with Bayes’ rule. This research is methodologically similar
to the revealed preferences approach in economics. Its results contradict the unqualified
assertion that people fail to make forecasts consistent with Bayes’ rule. On the contrary,
many cognitive scientists conclude that people’s judgments are largely consistent with
it (e.g., Chater, Tenenbaum, and Yuille 2006; Chater and Oaksford 2008; Edwards
1968). Consider Anderson’s (1990) rational analysis program, a term chosen Bout of
analogy to the rational man approach in economics^ (p. x). This ecological approach
models both conscious processes such as causal inference and problem solving and
unconscious processes such as memory and forgetting as Bayesian inference (Schooler
and Anderson 1997). Similarly, in BBayesian Models of Cognition,^ Griffiths, Kemp,
and Tenenbaum (2008) argued that both unconscious perceptual processes, such as
inferring the color and shape of objects, and high-level cognition, such as language
understanding and categorization, are consistent with Bayesian models. As a final case,
there is an influential Bayesian program in neuroscience that assumes a BBayesian
brain^ (e.g., Friston 2010).
Behavioral economists routinely claim that fast, unconscious, and automatic judg-
ments (the so-called BSystem 1^) do notwork by the rules of probability. Yet, according
to the many cognitive scientists just mentioned, they do.
The second paradigm does not involve probability learning. Instead, researchers
confront participants with text problems in which probabilities are numerically stated.
These tasks are also called decisions from description as opposed to decisions from
experience (Hertwig and Erev 2009). Within this paradigm are two kinds of text
problems. In the first, the only numbers participants are given are the base rates, such
as that 30 engineers and 70 lawyers were interviewed. Then they are given the
description of a person, such as one that incorporates stereotypical traits of an engineer.
On average, people’s estimates of the probability that the person was an engineer were
for the most part the same, independent of whether there were more engineers or
lawyers (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). This and similar results were interpreted as
instances of the base rate fallacy and hailed as Bperhaps one of the most significant
departures of intuition from the normative theory of prediction^ (p. 243).
As every practicing statistician knows, however, there is more to rationality than
inserting numbers into Bayes’ rule. There are assumptions that need to be checked. A
crucial assumption for the relevance of the base rates is that the person has been
randomly sampled from the population with the base rates specified. If not, the
normative relevance of the base rates is not given. Nonetheless, in some text problems,
including the celebrated BTom W.^ problem (Kahneman and Tversky 1973), no
information was given about random sampling. In others, such as the engineer-
lawyer problem, random sampling was asserted, but wrongly so, because the descrip-
tions were fabricated and not randomly sampled (Gigerenzer 2000, Chapter 12). In fact,
when the engineer-lawyer experiment was replicated so that people could randomly
draw a description out of an urn, their neglect of base rates largely disappeared
(Baratgin and Noveck 2000; Gigerenzer, Hell, and Blank 1988). Thus, one might
tentatively conclude that ordinary people are more sensitive to the assumption of
random sampling than the researchers who accuse them of irrationality.
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The second kind of textbook problems provides not only the base rate but also the hit rate
and the false alarm rate, and participants are asked to estimate the posterior probability. An
example is the Bcab problem^ (Tversky and Kahneman 1980). In keeping with Thaler and
Sunstein, there is robust evidence in this task that most people fail to make forecasts
consistent with Bayes’ rule. But there is an important caveat: People fail to do so if given
the information in terms of conditional probabilities (such as hit rates and false alarm rates).
The reason for the failure is not simply in the humanmind, but also in the ecology, that is, in
how the information is presented. Most of us have difficulties with conditional probabilities.
If the information is presented as the outcome of learning from experience, known as
natural frequencies, the proportion of people who reason in accord with Bayes’ rule rises
substantially (Brase 2007, 2009; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995; Hoffrage et al. 2000;
Kleiter 1994). That holds for both laypeople and professionals. For instance, on the basis
of conditional probabilities, only 21 % of 160 gynecologists correctly inferred the posterior
probability that a woman has breast cancer if she had a positive screening mammogram.
After the gynecologists were trained to translate conditional probabilities into natural
frequencies, 87 % could derive the Bayesian posterior probability (Gigerenzer et al.
2007). A Cochrane Systematic Review (Aki et al. 2011) also concluded that health
professionals and consumers understood natural frequencies better than probabilities. The
same technique helps judges, attorneys, and law students understand what a DNA match
means (Lindsey, Hertwig, and Gigerenzer 2003; Hoffrage et al. 2000), particularly when
pictorial representations are used (Cosmides and Tooby 1996; Shapira et al. 2011;
Spiegelhalter, Pearson, and Short 2011).
In sum, if one looks at the entire psychological literature, the claim that people
generally fail to reason the Bayesian way is not supported by the evidence. Rather, an
ecological analysis shows that certain presentations of information, such as natural
frequencies, enable humans to reason the Bayesian way and that others prevent
Bayesian thinking—just as we can do division more easily with Arabic numbers than
with Roman ones. As mentioned above, the cognitive science research concluding that
fast, intuitive inferences are consistent with Bayes’ rule directly contradicts the infa-
mous BSystem 1^ story that unconscious and elementary processes do not work by the
rules of probability (see Sunstein 2013, 2014; Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
2.2.1 Can People Learn Bayesian Inference?
Are people indeed virtually ineducable, as the analogy between cognitive and visual
illusions suggests? The study with gynecologists shows the opposite: Most doctors can
learn to reason the Bayesian way in one CME session. But do people retain what they
learn? A study entitled BTeaching Bayesian reasoning in less than 2 h^ (Sedlmeier and
Gigerenzer 2001) showed that 3 months after training with natural frequencies, there
was no sign of the usual forgetting that occurrs when people learn to insert probabilities
into Bayes’ rule. Even children can make forecasts consistent with Bayes’ rule. In a
study in Beijing, 135 children were given more than 1,000 Bayesian problems framed
in natural frequencies. The majority of 6th graders could judge the Bayesian posterior
probability precisely, as could one third of 5th graders and one sixth of 4th graders (Zhu
and Gigerenzer 2006). Not surprisingly, when the information was presented in
conditional probabilities, not a single child could solve any of the problems. With the
additional use of icons, German 4th graders could solve 60 % of Bayesian problems,
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and even 2nd graders could solve 22 % of them (Gigerenzer 2014a, 2014b; Multmeier
2012; see also Till 2013). Natural frequencies are now taught in mathematics curricula
in German schools and their use is recommended by major evidence-based medical
societies, such as the International Patient Decision Aid Standards Collaboration and
the Medicine and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (the United Kingdom’s
equivalent to the Food and Drug Administration).
All in all, the claim that people are poor Bayesians and can hardly unlearn their
biases is not supported by evidence.
2.3 Heuristics
Heuristics have gained an important role among libertarian paternalists, but mainly as being
the cause of mental biases. People Buse heuristics that lead them to make systematic
blunders^ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 176). By relying on logic or statistics rather than
on heuristics, people would behave optimally, it is said. Yet the argument that rules of logic
or statistics always define the optimal behavior is correct only in situations of risk, not of
uncertainty (Binmore 2008; Knight 1921). The term risk refers to situations where all
alternatives, consequences, and probabilities are known for certain, as in the Bayesian
textbook problems mentioned above or when playing the roulette wheel in a casino. Here,
one can calculate the expected loss in the long run, and no heuristics are needed. The term
uncertainty refers to real-world situations where not everything is known, where surprises
happen, and where there is no way to determine the optimal behavior, as in investment
banking and much of health care. Here, rational decisions can be made by appropriate
heuristics that aim at robustness rather than optimality. For Savage (1954), the father of
modern Bayesian optimization theory, even planning a picnic, not to speak of playing chess,
lies outside of Bayesian theory. This essential distinction between risk and uncertainty is
missed by behavioral economists who assert that heuristics are always second best.
For instance, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 133–136) reported that Harry Markowitz
did not use his Nobel Prize-winning mean-variance portfolio when investing in his own
retirement account, relying instead on the 1/N heuristic. This simple rule divides the
available asset equally across the N options or stocks, without having to estimate the
many parameters in the mean-variance portfolio. Comparing Markowitz to Homo
Simpson in this case would be highly inappropriate, seeing as Markowitz himself
discovered the method. DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) tested how well 1/N
did in the uncertain world of stocks. In six out of seven investment situations, 1/N
outperformed the Boptimal^ mean-variance portfolio according to standard criteria,
including the Sharpe Ratio. In this situation under uncertainty, making the optimization
calculations can mean losing money. The financial crisis beginning in 2007 has opened
the eyes of many to the fact that the standard probability models used, from value-at-
risk to the Gaussian copula function, were part of the problem rather than the solution.
The real question is one of ecological rationality: to specify the environmental
structures in which a given heuristic is likely more accurate than competing methods.
For instance, 1/N is likely to result in better performance than Markowitz optimization
when (i) the market is highly unstable, (ii) the number of options is large, and (iii) the
sample size is small. Such analysis can explain inconsistent results when comparing
1/N with mean-variance portfolios (Brodie, Daubechies, De Mol, Giannone, and Loris
2009). The study of ecological rationality is described in Gigerenzer, Todd, and the
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ABC Research Group (1999), Gigerenzer, Hertwig, and Pachur (2011), and Gigerenzer
and Selten (2001). It is a mathematical analysis that addresses Herbert Simon’s analogy
of the Bpair of scissors,^ that is, how cognition and environment together produce
rational behavior. Recall that Kahneman and Tversky have often acknowledged that
heuristics are sometimes good and sometimes bad but have never gone a step further to
specify when exactly Bsometimes^ is. The study of the ecological rationality takes that
step. It contradicts the bare-bone claim that statistical optimization is always better than
heuristics.
Finally, behavioral economists have made the general argument that violations of
rationality axioms (such as when people rely on heuristics) provide a new rationale for
paternalism. However, the argument that individual biases imply aggregate losses in
efficiency and thus justify paternalism can be formally proven wrong (Berg and
Gigerenzer 2007). BBounded rationality^ does not imply paternalism.
3 On the Argument that People Are Not Easily Educable
As mentioned before, this argument is made implicitly by comparing cognitive illu-
sions to stable visual illusions, the reptilian brain, and the supposedly biologically old
BSystem 1^ that is Bnot readily educable^ (Kahneman 2011, p. 417). Evolutionary
biologist Stephen Jay Gould (1992) similarly argued that Bour minds are not built (for
whatever reason) to work by the rules of probability^ (p. 469), and Richard Thaler is
quoted in a Nature article covering the debate on nudging versus educating as saying:
BOur ability to de-bias people is quite limited^ (Bond 2009, p. 1191). As a conse-
quence, legal scholar Dan Kahan is quoted in the same article as saying, BRisk
decision-making should be concentrated to an even greater extent in politically insu-
lated expert agencies^ (pp. 1189–1190).
I have two responses. First, consider situations of uncertainty (as opposed to risk),
where the optimal action cannot be known. Here, paying attention to framing and using
smart heuristics can be more intelligent than logical rationality. In such situations, there
is little reason to educate people out of their intuitive intelligence into logical but
inferior behavior. Second, consider situations of risk where statistical thinking is
rational, but where people fail to reason according to some rule. In these situations,
people can learn. That may require teaching them proper tools, such as natural
frequencies. Back in 1986, Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett taught 347 adults and high school
students from New Jersey suburban communities the law of large numbers. The 25 min
training session had a marked effect on the quality of the participants’ reasoning about
everyday problems. Similarly, Nisbett (2009) showed how IQ can be substantially
improved by training. Teaching statistical thinking is a viable option, as anyone who
attends the International Conferences on Teaching Statistics experiences.
The true alternative to nudging is education: making children and adults risk savvy. That
encompasses statistical thinking and heuristic thinking, and judgments about the limits and
possibilities of both approaches. Unfortunately, children in most countries are not taught
statistical and heuristic thinking, themathematics of uncertainty, but only themathematics of
certainty, such as geometry and trigonometry. Education, however, is outside the scope of
libertarian paternalists. And that omission is not accidental but a direct consequence of a
philosophy that compares cognitive errors to stable, inevitable visual illusions.
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Yet that view ignores the fact that education is clearly associated with healthy behavior.
Obesity, for instance, ismore prevalent among less-educated people. Consider cancer, one of
the most dreaded diseases. As we have seen, people are Bnudged^ into cancer screening,
even when it saves few or no lives and instead harms many through unnecessary biopsies or
surgery (Welch 2004). Education would be the better weapon because about half of cancers
are due to behavior: mostly smoking, obesity, lack of movement, and alcohol. But to be
effective, teaching would need to start early, before eating, drinking, and smoking habits are
established in puberty. School programs that teach children the joy of cooking, the basics of
a healthy life, and how to see through industrial attempts to seduce them into unhealthy
behavior could save substantially more lives from cancer than screening and cancer drugs
together (Gigerenzer 2014a, b). And such an early education can produce spillover effects to
health in general.
4 On the Assumption of Benevolent Choice Architects
Nudging people into what is best for them requires choice architects who actually know
what is best for others. Yet this requirement contains an unresolved contradiction (Berg
and Gigerenzer 2010; Rebonato 2012). On the one hand, experts are said to be subject
to the same cognitive biases as ordinary people; on the other hand, they are supposed to
be rational and discern what people really want or need. For instance, although Thaler
and Sunstein have jokingly reported falling prey themselves to biases, they continue to
write as if ultimately transcending these.
Moreover, the ideal of choice architects who act like benevolent philosopher-kings
goes beyond merely discerning people’s true needs and preferences. It requires that
choice architects:
1. do not practice defensive decision-making,
2. understand scientific evidence, and
3. have no conflicting interests.
Consider health care, where libertarian paternalists have argued that governments,
hospitals, and doctors should nudge people into proper behavior. Such nudges would
benefit patients only if these three conditions are in place. In health care in the US,
Germany, and other Western countries, however, these conditions are typically not met
(Gigerenzer and Muir Gray 2011).
1. Self-defense. Many health care providers practice defensive medicine. That is,
instead of recommending what they believe is best for the patient, they suggest a
second-best option in order to protect themselves from potential lawsuits. For instance,
93 % of 824 doctors in Pennsylvania admitted practicing defensive medicine, such as
ordering unnecessary CT scans, antibiotics, and invasive surgery (Studdert et al. 2005).
2. Innumeracy. Many health care providers do not understand health statistics. For
instance, 70–80 % of U.S. primary care physicians did not understand survival rates in
cancer screening and could easily be manipulated into recommending screening, even
if its harms exceeded its benefits (Wegwarth, Schwartz, Woloshin, Gaissmaier, and
Gigerenzer 2012).
376 G. Gigerenzer
3. Conflicts of Interest. Some health care providers pursue profit instead of best
practice. This state of affairs is a principal-agent problem in which the agent (doctor,
hospital) is motivated to act in its own best interests rather than in those of the principal
(patient). For instance, every year, an estimated one million U.S. children have
unnecessary CT scans (Brenner and Hall 2007). A CT scan is a major source of income
but exposes a child to radiation levels in the order of one hundred chest X-rays,
contributing to an estimated 29,000 cancers that result from the approximately 70
million CT scans performed annually in the U. S., with figures rising (Berrington de
González et al. 2009).
This trio of systemic biases has been dubbed the SIC Syndrome (Self-defense,
Innumeracy, and Conflicts of interest) in health care (Gigerenzer 2014b). To the degree
that the syndrome is in place, choice architects may steer the public into directions that
are not in their best interest.
4.1 When Choice Architects Pursue Objectives Against People’s Best Interests
Breast Self-Examination Some choice architects have argued that women who do not
perform monthly breast self-examination are Brisk-averse^ and have recommended
using a loss frame instead of a gain frame to persuade women to do the exams
(Meyerowtiz and Chaiken 1987; Salovey and Williams-Piehota 2004). Another nudg-
ing technique is to tell women that most other women their age regularly do self-
examinations. Yet randomized trials found no evidence that self-examination actually
reduces breast cancer mortality; instead there was evidence that it causes harms, such as
an increased number of biopsies (Kösters and Gøtzsche 2003). To this day, many
women are steered into self-examination without being informed that the scientific
evidence shows no benefit. As mentioned above, health organizations nudge women
into breast cancer screening by sending invitations without mentioning that randomized
studies with over 500,000 women have failed to provide evidence that the benefits are
larger than the harms (Gøtzsche and Jørgensen 2013). Here, nudging serves the
interests of the multibillion mammography industry and does not enable women to
make informed decisions.
Vaccination Against H1N1 In 2009, with the outbreak of the swine flu pandemic, a
number of governments bought flu vaccines and medication such as Tamiflu, as
recommended by the WHO. Yet uptake rates were low in some countries. Sunstein
(2013, p. 59) suggested that compliance may be nudged by, for instance, giving people
maps showing the route to the local vaccination center. That would indeed be a good
tool when vaccination or medications actually reduce serious complications and death.
But in the case of Tamiflu, years later there is still no evidence that it does. Roche, its
manufacturer, refuses to reveal the data, despite requests by the British Medical Journal
(which has published its correspondence with Roche on its website). Why did the
WHO encourage governments in the first place to stockpile antivirals, without any
evidence? The answer appears to be conflicts of interest: Many of the experts advising
the WHO had financial ties to the pharmaceutical firms that produce the drugs (Cohen
and Carter 2010). In this case, nudging helps to fill the bank accounts of the pharma-
ceutical industry and empty those of both the nudgers and the nudged.
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PSA Tests Sunstein (2005) proposed that Bhospitals might frame options in a way that
will lead people to choose medical procedures that are clearly best, even if a small
probability of failure might frighten some patients and lead them to less promising
options. There is a warning here about the popular idea of patient autonomy^ (p. 180).
Again, this would be a useful nudge if hospitals had no conflicting interests.
Unfortunately, they often do and pursue goals diametrically opposed to those of their
patients. For instance, many hospitals recommend that men take routine PSA tests for
prostate cancer screening, despite the National Cancer Institute’s cautions that PSA
screening can do more harm than good. By twisting health statistics in an advertise-
ment, the highly respected U.S. cancer center MD Anderson systematically misled men
about the benefits of prostate cancer screening, similar to how the pink ribbon
organization Susan G. Komen deceived women about breast cancer screening (for
details see Woloshin and Schwartz 2012; Woloshin, Schwartz, and Welch 2008).As in
the case of Tamiflu, access to the results of medical science is often impeded by a flood
of biased information. For instance, a representative study in nine countries showed that
more than 90 % of Europeans overestimate the benefits of PSA and mammography
screening by a factor of 10, 100, 200, or do not know them (Gigerenzer, Mata, and
Frank 2009). The reason is not that so many Europeans think irrationally; rather, they
are Bnudged^ into screening by misleading statistics (Gigerenzer 2014a, b).
Similar conflicts of interest emerge when governments decide on the details for
automatically enlisting people in pension plans (Rebonato 2012). Nudging may be
effective if choice architects have the welfare of the public at heart. But in situations
where politicians engage in defensive decisions, are risk illiterate, or have conflicting
interests – the SIC Syndrome – nudging is not ecologically rational.
4.2 AWord on BSystem 1^ and BSystem 2^
Libertarian paternalists tend to explain all behavior with the help of two concepts
of the mind. BSystem 1^ is said to be fast and unconscious, to work by intuition
and heuristics, and to be the cause of error and lack of rationality. In contrast,
BSystem 2^ is said to be slow and conscious, to work by logic and statistics, and
to make no apparent errors. This vague distinction lacks formal precision of the
underlying processes in each system; its only content is the assumption that these
various dichotomies are aligned. But aligning heuristics with unconsciousness and
errors is not correct (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer 2011). Every heuristic I have
studied can be used both consciously and unconsciously, and in certain situations
can lead to better performance than that of the logical or statistical models that are
presented as rational per se. For instance, the 1/N heuristic is used consciously, not
just unconsciously, by investors, and can make more money than mean-variance
optimization in investment situations where the heuristic is ecologically rational
(see above). One formal basis to understanding why and when less information is
more beneficial is the bias-variance dilemma (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009).
Thus, heuristics, unconsciousness, and error proneness are not aligned in one
system, as claimed. Nor are statistics, logic, and consciousness aligned in another
system. As mentioned above, there is a long tradition in cognitive science that
models unconscious or intuitive judgments by probability theory, inconsistent with
Systems 1 and 2.
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Where the real problem lies with the two-systems distinction is in its vagueness. It
makes it possible to explain everything after the fact but not to deduce any interesting
novel prediction. Usually, science progresses from vague dichotomies to precise
models; the two-systems story is the only case I know of where it went the other
way. Behavioral economists have reduced existing mathematical models of heuristic
and statistical inference to two black boxes. Freud already had three systems.
5 Conclusion: More Risk Savvy Citizens, Less Nudging
In this article, I assessed the scientific evidence presented for the justification of the
nudging program: the claim that psychological research has clearly shown that people’s
judgments systematically deviate from rationality and that it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to educate people out of their biases. I focused on three alleged cognitive
deviations from rationality: framing effects, base rate fallacy, and heuristics. My conclu-
sion is that the justification of nudging rather than education assumes overly narrow
logical norms of rationality and suffers from a confirmation bias, that is, selective reporting
of relevant research. For each of the three Bdeviations,^ the case for deviations from
rationality is overstated, and evidence indicating that people are not educable is sparse.
Where does that leave us? As mentioned before, the true alternative to blaming and
nudging people is to educate them. Being risk savvy encompasses both statistical
thinking and heuristic thinking, and the awareness that the first applies to situations
of risk, while the second is indispensable in situations of uncertainty. Usually, parts of
the risks are known and others not, meaning that both of these tools are needed.
Libertarian paternalists believe that there is no alternative to their philosophy. But
what if nudging stops when a different political party with other interests comes into
power? What if the tobacco and fast-food industry counteracts by investing billions into
nudging people into the opposite direction? Nudging people without educating them
means infantilizing the public. This becomes particularly relevant in the digital revo-
lution, as evident in Google’s search results, which were personalized in 2009. Since
then, when two people perform the same search, they no longer see the same results. By
providing personalized rank orders, search engines make us see what we like to see and
what we have looked at before. This technique exploits the fact that about 90 % of the
clicks are on the first page, with a third on the first result. Originally envisioned as a
tool for providing the same information to every citizen on earth and creating a new era
of transparency as the basis for democratic societies, the Internet now steers users into
personalized bubbles where they are unlikely to encounter diverging points of view
(Pariser, 2011). Manipulation of rank orders of search engine results about political
candidates has been shown to influence the outcome of democratic elections, giving
nudging a new political dimension (Epstein, R. and Roberson, R. E. The search engine
manipulation effect (SEME): Search rankings can shift voter preferences substantially
without their awareness (unpublshed)).
A more enduring solution in my view is investing in making people risk savvy. To
be effective, education should start early, before young people are seduced into
smoking, eating unhealthy food, and similar behaviors. I have sketched out such a
program of becoming risk literate in health, finance, and digital media in Gigerenzer
(2014b).
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At issue is not simply the choice between paternalism and libertarianism.
Nudging people into healthy behavior has limited chances of success when
competing commercial firms with larger budgets use the same methods to
nudge people into unhealthy behavior. Investing in risk-savvy citizens, by
contrast, enables a sustainable solution: citizens who see through manipulation
and can make informed decisions themselves.
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